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Abstract: This article analyses the use of religion in Indonesian 
elections. It fundamentally argues that religion has been utilized 
by both secular and religious politicians to boost their electoral 
gain. Focusing on national and local elections in the past five 
years of Indonesian politics, this study suggests that religion is a 
significant instrument in the electoral decision-making process, 
both from the perspective of voters and candidates. Much of 
the data in writing this article derive from my current research 
project funded by the Indonesian Ministry of Research, 
Technology and Higher Education. Other data come from 
leading survey institutes, particularly Lembaga Survey Indonesia 
(LSI), Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC) and 
Indikator Politik Indonesia.  
Keywords: Election, democracy, political Islam, intolerance, 
Indonesia 
 
Introduction 
The question whether religion plays any significant role in an 
electoral vote has been intriguing students and scholars of political 
behavior for the past half a century. A classic work by Alamond and 
Verba suggests a strong relation between religion and political 
participation among voters in the United States. 2  Mujani's study 
confirms their thesis in the Indonesian context, as Indonesian 
                                                                
1 I would like to thank my colleagues, Dr. Shiskha Prabawaningtyas, Dr. Sunaryo and 
Joko Arizal, MA, for their support and encouraging discussions throughout writing 
this article. I would also like to thank Natalia Laskowska, for reading and improving 
the draft of  the article. 
2  Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and 
Democracy in Five Nations ( California: Sage Publication, 1989). 
DOI: 10.15642/JIIS.2019.13.2.454-479 
  
Religion as a Political Tool 
455 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 13, Number 02, December 2019 
democracy is aided by the civic culture that has grown within two 
major Islamic organizations, namely Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU). 3  However, as most studies on religion and voting 
behavior emphasize the significance of people's role and participation 
in the democratic process, they see religious motives only as factors 
that drive voters to the polling stations. While focusing on citizens or 
people (not the elites) as a crucial element in the democratic process is 
important, it ignores some more complex issues related to religious 
behavior.  
In electoral dynamics, religious communities are not passive 
groups governed by theological doctrine, congregation, or civic culture 
ingrained in their social tradition. Political events in Indonesia show 
the involvement of political actors who actively encourage and 
mobilize religious groups to engage more deeply in politics and cast 
their ballots in voting booths. In other words, their participation in 
democracy is not merely a matter of civic culture or congregational 
tradition, as Alamond and Verba suggest. There is an ideological factor 
to it and the engagement of elites that make them actively involved in 
politics. 
A number of survey data show the existence of a strong 
connection between religion and political behavior, especially between 
religious motives and the push to choose a candidate in election. An 
exit poll by Indikator Politik Indonesia conducted in the 2019 election, 
found that 59,1% of Indonesian voters considered religion to be 
important in determining their political choices. 18,4% acknowledged 
that they would consider religion in their political decision. Most 
respondents were Muslims. They believed that Islam obliges them to 
consider religion in electing a leader.4 This was confirmed by political 
campaigning in which religious issues were widely addressed. In North 
Sumatra, West Java, Central Java, and Jakarta, religion was used by 
most candidates both to appeal to their constituents and to attack their 
political rivals. Religion was used not only where candidates were of 
different religious backgrounds. In elections where all candidates are 
Muslims, like in gubernatorial elections in West Java and Central Java, 
religion was also used. 
                                                                
3 Saiful Mujani, Muslim Demokrat: Islam, Budaya Demokrasi, dan Partisipasi Politik di 
Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2007). 
4 Indikator Politik Indonesia, “Exit Poll Pemilu 2019,” April 17, 2019. 
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What is interesting about this identity war in Indonesian politics is 
that religion is not only used by religious or pious people, but also by 
secular politicians who have nothing to do with religious agendas. In 
the legislative elections, some secular candidates tried to appear 
religious by posing in Islamic attire on photographs for billboards and 
other advertising venues. They frequently went to mosques and 
attended Islamic teaching circles (majelis ta'lim); some of them probably 
for the first time in their lives. Certain Christian politicians also tried to 
appear Muslim, including by wearing the hijab (veil) if they were female 
candidates or baju koko and a Muslim cap if they were men, to hide 
their real faith. Hary Tanoesoedibjo, chairman of the Perindo Party, 
who is clearly of Chinese descent and a Christian, often visited 
mosques wearing a sorban or a prayer cap (peci haji) – the kind of 
headgear usually worn by Muslim clerics. 
Religion has become a powerful tool for politicians. During the 
early years of Reformasi, the politicization of religion was often 
associated with Islamic parties, which clearly campaigned for an 
Islamic agenda such as the implementation of shari'a. Now, everyone 
plays religion for politics. Identity politics that is played by Islamists 
encouraged other politicians, generally from secular backgrounds who 
had not been interested in religious issues, to use the same tool to 
defeat them. The 2019 election is the clearest evidence of how 
nationalist-secular groups use religion for their electoral purposes. 
Both presidential candidates, Prabowo Subianto and Joko “Jokowi” 
Widodo do not come from an Islamic background. Both, to use 
Clifford Geertz's term, come from priyayi and abangan families, 
respectively. And both of them used religion for their political 
purposes. While Prabowo used the Islamists, particularly the 
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Jokowi used traditionalist groups, 
mainly NU. 
Nick Kuipers’s study on how legislative candidates across 
Indonesia used religion is interesting to note. Most candidates from all 
political parties used religion or at least tended to portray themselves as 
religious. Studying their visions and missions that were submitted to 
the General Election Committee (KPU), Kuipers found that a majority 
of over 20,000 candidates in the 2019 election mentioned religious 
concepts such as “Allah,” “Islam,” “syariat,” “ummat,” “dakwah,” and 
“agama.” These words featured prominently in the statements they 
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submitted with their CVs to the KPU. Unsurprisingly, most of the 
candidates who used the terms were those from Muslim-based parties 
such as the PKS and the National Awakening Party (PKB). However, 
nationalist-secular parties like the Indonesian Democratic Party of 
Struggle (PDI-P) also did not desist from using religion in their 
campaigns.5  
This article explores the role of religion in Indonesian politics, 
particularly in the 2019 election. Certainly, the election is a complex 
enterprise whose aspect goes beyond the issue of religion. However, in 
this article, I would like to focus on how religion plays its role and how 
people use it as their political tool. In the wake of identity politics and 
global rise of populism, religion has an ample room to be expressed. 
The central question that this article addresses is who are the main 
actors and how do they deal with the issue? What makes the new 
politicization of religion different from the same phenomenon in the 
past? 
 
Secular Use of Religion 
The term "secular use of religion" was introduced by Ashis Nandy 
in a paper titled "The Return of the Sacred". 6 He uses it to refer to 
political behavior in South Asia, especially India and Pakistan, where 
religion is used by religious and non-religious people for secular aims. 
Nandy argues that hate speech and polarization campaigns in the name 
of Hinduism in India or Islam in Pakistan have amalgamated with 
religious and non-religious interests. In many cases, secular politicians 
naively work with fanatics for the sake of political-economic goals. In a 
world where religious and secular interests are deeply intertwined, it is 
virtually difficult to distinguish what is secular and what is religious. As 
Nandy puts it: "... we are left with no alternative but to admit that the 
world of religion parallels the secular world and can be as much a 
domain of gratuitous violence, paranoia and sadomasochism".7 
Political practices that Nandy found in India are not alien to 
Indonesia. Politicians and business people often use religion for their 
                                                                
5 Nick Kuipers, “Who’s Running on Islam in Indonesia?,” New Mandala, March 26, 
2019. 
6 Ashis Nandy, “The Return of the Sacred: The Language of Religion and the Fear of 
Democracy in a Post-Secular World,” The Mahesh Chandra Regmi Lecture (Kathmandu: 
Publisher for Social Science, 2007). 
7 Ibid., p. 3. 
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political-economic purposes. A good example in the Indonesian 
context is what happened during the gubernatorial election in Jakarta 
in 2017. As many scholars have explained,8 the election was one the 
most controversial votes in Indonesian history. It had various aspects, 
from politics, business, to religion. The controversy itself was initially 
propelled by a statement by former governor Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaya 
Purnama that some Muslims might not elect him – a Christian – 
because the Qur'an advises them not to. Ahok was an incumbent in 
the election. He made the statement during a campaign visit to Pulau 
Pramuka, an island in Thousand Islands district, North Jakarta. 
Footage from the speech spread quickly and was politicized. The 
governor was suddenly accused of blasphemy. Although there was 
nothing wrong with Ahok’s words, as the Qur'an indeed says so, 
according to many Muslims he had no right to refer to the scripture.  
The gubernatorial race saw the most vulgar examples of political 
competition in the history of Indonesia's elections. It clearly 
demonstrated how religious people, secular politicians and 
businessmen joined together for their political goals. For Islamists, the 
election was a golden opportunity to get rid of the Christian governor 
whose being in office they considered as against Islamic teachings. 
Since Ahok replaced Jokowi in 2014, Islamists considered him an 
enemy of Islam simply because he is a Christian. For the political 
opposition, to take him down was a strategic move. The opposition 
felt marginalized since the capital city was under Jokowi-Ahok. Many 
of their agendas were blocked as Ahok set a rigid rule on how the 
regional budget would be spent. Ahok also often embarrassed them in 
public over extravagant spending of public money. Opposition parties 
such as the PKS and Gerindra were the most vocal ones among the 
groups that fought Ahok. They worked hard to find any possible way 
to topple him. 
The Jakarta election was an open stage on which Islamists and 
secularists collaborated to bring the governor down. Some secular-
nationalist figures suddenly pretend to be Islamic and speak with 
                                                                
8 Marcus Mietzner, Burhanuddin Muhtadi, and Rizka Halida, “Entrepreneurs of 
Grievance: Drivers and Effects of Indonesia’s Islamist Mobilization,” Bijdragen Tot de 
Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde 174 (January 1, 2018): pp. 159–87; Luthfi Assyaukanie, 
“Unholy Alliance: Ultra-Conservatism and Political Pragmatism in Indonesia,” 
Thinking Asean, No. 19, January 2017; Muhammad Wildan, “Islamism and 
Democratization in the Post 411 and 212 Rallies of Indonesia,” Thinking Asean, 19 
(January 2017). 
  
Religion as a Political Tool 
459 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 13, Number 02, December 2019 
Islamist rhetoric. Gatot Nurmantyo, then Armed Forces (TNI) chief, 
who has no Islamic background, suddenly started to pose as an Islamic 
hero. He deliberately wore a white cap (peci haji) in the phenomenal 
December 2, 2016 rally in Central Jakarta. Despite his status as the 
chief of TNI – which is supposed to support government – he took 
the side of Islamists. Gatot openly accused Ahok of blasphemy and 
demanded that he be tried. He criticized the government and labeled 
Indonesian democracy as countering Islam.9 Gatot suddenly became 
an Islamist leader alongside Prabowo and other secular-nationalist 
figures. Former President Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) is 
another example of how a secular-nationalist leader unhesitatingly uses 
religion for political interests. SBY certainly was not looking for any 
position in the government. However, his son, Agus Yudhoyono, was 
a strong candidate for Jakarta's governor. SBY was deeply involved in 
his Agus's campaign for the office. My sources told me that he 
approached Ma'ruf Amin, the chairman of the Indonesian Ulama 
Council (MUI) to issue a fatwa against Ahok. He urged the police to 
immediately arrest Ahok on blasphemy charges.10 
For some entrepreneurs, Ahok's blasphemy case was a golden 
opportunity. It is widely known that Ahok’s development policies in 
Jakarta were not for the benefit of businessmen, who profited from 
the collaborative rule of previous administrations. During Ahok’s era, 
many development projects were delegated to state-owned enterprises 
(BUMN), which left private companies marginalized. Before Ahok, 
collaboration between private companies and state bureaucracy was 
quite common and drove corruption. During Ahok's era, such 
practices were wiped out. In short, Ahok was the main obstacle for 
many business people in the capital. 
During the gubernatorial campaign period, their fight against Ahok 
was clearly manifest. They supported anti-Ahok Islamist groups. Some 
of them even joined the “212 movement.” The “212 movement” 
refers to a big rally in Jakarta on December 2, 2016, where over 
                                                                
9 “Cara Gatot Nurmantyo Cari Panggung Sebelum Pensiun,” https://tirto.id/cara-ga-
tot-nurmantyo-cari-panggung-sebelum-pensiun-cxsW. Accessed on July 14, 2019. 
10  “Desak Ahok Diproses Hukum, SBY Dianggap Intervensi” https://nasional.-
kompas.com/read/2016/11/03/05300031/desak.ahok.diproses.hukum.sby.dianggap.i
ntervensi.?page=all accessed on 24 July 2019; “SBY Lantang Minta Ahok Harus 
Diproses Hukum” https://www.merdeka.com/politik/sby-lantang-minta-ahok-harus-
diproses-hukum.html accessed on 24 July 2019. 
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500,000 people gathered around the National Monument (Monas). 
They protested against Ahok and demanded he be tried and sent to jail 
for blasphemy. While some businessmen were openly involved in the 
rally, some supported it from behind the scenes with funding.11 
Hary Tanoesoedibjo, for example, overtly supported 
demonstrations against Ahok by covering them live in his television 
networks. Tanoesoedibjo is a successful businessman, a Christian of 
Chinese descent, exactly like Ahok, but the latter's rule was against his 
business interests. I was told by several sources that Tanoesoedibjo 
was once extremely disappointed when one of his business projects in 
Jakarta was annulled by Ahok on grounds that it broke a city 
regulation.12 
Another businessman who openly supported the 212 movement 
was Tommy Soeharto and his family. Tommy was purported to have 
helped Islamists hold anti-Ahok rallies. His sisters, particularly Titik 
and Tutut, who are also businesswomen took part in the 
demonstrations and hoisted ISIS-like flags belonging to Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia (HTI). It is unimaginable that Soeharto’s children would do 
this in the times of their father. Soeharto was known for his anti-
Islamist stance, especially in the 1980s. He would certainly have 
banned organizations such as HTI. While Tommy and his family did 
not exactly mean to fight against Ahok, they were targeting President 
Jokowi. It is in the Jokowi era that many assets of Soeharto's family 
have been questioned and returned to the state. Many of the 
businesses that had been monopolized by Soeharto's family are now 
regulated and open to the public. Tommy and his siblings are no 
longer able to engage in their entrepreneurial activities as they used to. 
Working with Islamists was the only viable way for them to return to 
the olden days. For Tommy, fighting Ahok was part of a bigger 
opposition against Jokowi who has been considered the family's enemy. 
Meanwhile, Islamists seemed happy to be cooperating with Soeharto's 
children. In fact, some of them were missing his times and were 
advocating for the late former dictator to be elevated to the stature of a 
national hero.13  
                                                                
11 Assyaukanie, “Unholy Alliance. 
12 Conversations with several sources in Jakarta. 
13  “PKS Dukung Soeharto Raih Gelar Pahlawan Nasional,” https://nasional.-
republika.co.id/berita/breaking-news/nasional/10/10/25/142236-pks-dukung-soe-
harto-raih-gelar-pahlawan-nasional accessed on 11 July 2019; “PKS Dukung Soeharto 
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The secular support for the Islamists was largely successful. Ahok 
lost to Anies Baswedan, an opportunist politician who in the election 
appealed the Islamists and radicals. Anies's full-fledged support for the 
Islamist cause surprised many people, as he had been known as a 
Muslim moderate. He comes from a nationalist family of Arab descent. 
In 2014, he fully supported Jokowi and was appointed as his education 
minister. However, in early 2016 he was sacked for incompetence.14 
Enraged he shot for the governor position and went against Jokowi. 
Eventually, he embraced Islamist narratives. He visited the 
headquarters of the vigilante FPI for support. In his campaign, Anies 
praised the Islamist and condemned the secular and liberal. His 
strategy proved successful. Ahok lost his position by a double-digit 
margin in the second round of the election. Most of Anies's support 
came from Islamists who aggressively and massively stirred hate 
speech and anti-Chinese sentiment during the poll.15 
Success in the Jakarta gubernatorial election inspired Islamists and 
Baswedan supporters, particularly PKS and Gerindra, to replicate the 
campaign on the national scale – the 2019 general election. They 
believed that with Islamic solidarity being able to bring Ahok down, 
the same would work to help Prabowo win the presidential vote. This 
explains why polarization in the 2019 election was so tense. Most of 
the key players were the same actors who helped Baswedan win office 
in 2017.  
Nevertheless, the central figure in this religion game was definitely 
Prabowo, Jokowi's sole contender. Prabowo seemed to be fully aware 
that Islamic sentiment could be effectively used against Jokowi. He 
realized that it is impossible to defeat the strong incumbent who had a 
very high approval rating. Jokowi did almost all of what Prabowo 
wanted to offer in his political campaigns – reducing poverty, 
increasing job opportunities, building roads and infrastructure, and 
                                                                                                                                      
Pahlawan Nasional,” https://www.antaranews.com/berita/230059/pks-dukung-soe-
harto-pahlawan-nasional accessed on 11 July 2019. 
14  “Diganti, Anies Baswedan Dinilai Sedikit Melenceng Dari Visi Presiden,” 
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/08/06/19320281/diganti.anies.baswedan.di
nilai.sedikit.melenceng.dari.visi.presiden accessed on 14 July 2019. 
15 Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman and Prashant Waikar, “Fear and Loathing: 
Uncivil Islamism and Indonesia’s Anti-Ahok Movement,” Indonesia, 106 (2018): pp. 89-
109; Emirza Adi Syailendra, “2017 Jakarta’s Election and Participatory Politics - 
What’s Gone Wrong with Indonesia’s Democracy?,” RSIS Commentaries 105 (May 
26, 2017). 
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universal healthcare. The only weapon that could be utilized against 
Jokowi was the one that proved powerful in the Jakarta election – 
religious sentiment. 
Prabowo had a good partner to execute his plans, namely PKS, an 
Islamic party whose agenda is to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. 
Although Prabowo's views are different from those of PKS, he seemed 
undisturbed. For him, winning the presidential race was much more 
important. He might have thought that PKS’s ambitions could be 
handled later, and if he had won, he could as well get rid of them.16 
PKS was the mastermind behind the smear campaign of Prabowo’s 
camp. Filled with young educated Muslims, PKS is perhaps the most 
literate political party in terms of using digital technology. They 
regularly created trending topics on Twitter and boosted various issues 
on other social media platforms. PKS has an effective political 
machinery to mobilize people. The biggest campaign of Prabowo’s 
camp at the Gelora Bung Karno stadium in Jakarta several days before 
the election was designed by PKS. The campaign was strongly Islamist, 
anti-pluralist, making even SBY – who was in the camp endorsing 
Prabowo's candidacy – criticize the event as partisan and unpatriotic.17 
The 2019 presidential election was a manifestation of how religion 
was used for political gain. Worried by Prabowo's move, Jokowi made 
an unpredictable move. He also used the Islamic card by appointing 
Ma'ruf Amin as his running mate. No one expected that he would go 
as far as this. Media speculations suggested that the strongest candidate 
for Jokowi's vice president was Mahfud MD, a Muslim moderate, legal 
expert, ex-chairman of the Constitutional Court. Many people, 
particularly the elites, believed that Mahfud was an ideal candidate. A 
survey among members of the elite conducted by SMRC, in which I 
was one of surveyors, concluded that Mahfud was the best choice. 
Over 70 percent of my respondents preferred Mahfud, and none of 
them mentioned Ma'ruf.18  
                                                                
16 “Allan Nairn Rilis Skenario Prabowo Lemahkan HTI dan PKS di Blognya,”  
https://tirto.id/allan-nairn-rilis-skenario-prabowo-lemahkan-hti-dan-pks-di-blognya-
dmaS accessed on 14 July 2019. 
17  “SBY Kritik Kampanye Akbar Prabowo, BPN: Bukan Politik Identitas,” 
https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1193649/sby-kritik-kampanye-akbar-prabowo-bpn-
bukan-politik-identitas accessed on 25 July 2019. 
18 SMRC, “Calon Wakil Presiden: Penilaian Elite, Opinion Leader, dan Massa Pemilih 
Nasional,” (May 2018). 
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Mahfud has been known as a scholar with progressive views. He 
was close to former President Abdurrahman “Gus Dur” Wahid and 
served as one of his ministers. He is respected in both secular-
nationalist and Islamic circles. However, despite his closeness with the 
Muslim community and the fact that he comes from Madura – home 
to one of the most religious ethnic groups in Indonesia – he seemed 
not Islamic enough for Jokowi and his team to counter the challenge 
from Prabowo's camp. Despite his closeness with Gus Dur, Mahfud is 
not well-received in NU. Some NU elites, particularly in the National 
Awakening Party (PKB) do not like him. This might have disturbed 
Jokowi. He changed his mind in last minute and appointed Ma'ruf. The 
move divided his supporters and made some of them mobilize for 
abstention (Golput) to decrease Jokowi's vote. Many of those who 
decided to go Golput could not forget Ma'ruf's role in the Ahok case 
and the intolerance he espoused while leading the MUI. They saw 
Ma'ruf as a dangerous figure who could harm Indonesia's future. 
Jokowi's decision to choose Ma'ruf as running mate proved 
effective. Many people now speculate that had Jokowi chosen Mahfud 
MD or another candidate, he might have lost the race. The campaign 
against his Islamic credentials was so strong that even with Ma'ruf by 
his side attacks remained harsh. They might have been more brutal if 
someone else was his vice-presidential candidate. For Islamists in 
Prabowo's camp, the appointment of Ma'ruf did not lessen their 
enmity towards Jokowi. To many of them, particularly in the 
modernist PKS, Ma'ruf is an NU man and an opportunist politician.19 
But for Jokowi, Ma'ruf's appointment was crucial, mainly to break 
down Islamist solidity. By taking Ma'ruf, Jokowi has secured support 
of the majority portion of Muslim groups. Jokowi was fully aware that 
modernists should be prevented from uniting with traditionalists (NU) 
if he were to win the election. He had to find a way to embrace the 
biggest part of Muslim votes, which means the votes of NU. A rivalry 
between modernists and traditionalists was another important 
dimension of the 2019 election, which I will explain in the next two 
sections. 
 
 
                                                                
19 Interviews separately with Abdul Rahim, local chairman of  PKS, Medan, Faisal A. 
Arfa, chairman of  Muhammadiyah, Medan, and Hamim Ilyas, chairman of  
Muhammadiyah, Yogyakarta. Time of  interviews is mentioned in the list below. 
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Modernist Strategy 
One of the reasons why the 2019 election was heavily dominated 
by religion is the role of Muslim modernists. They are the most 
aggressive group in addressing religious issues. Before I move to the 
role they play in contemporary Indonesian politics, let me briefly 
explain who are modernists and how do they differ from Muslim 
traditionalists in the Indonesian context. The explanation is important 
to avoid confusion regarding the groups that I repeatedly mention in 
this article. 
The terms “modernist” and “traditionalist” are widely used by 
scholars of Indonesia to refer two major Muslim groups in Indonesia.20 
Modernists are a group of Muslims who believe that Islam is 
compatible with the modern world. They generally accept modern 
values and technology. Before the independence of Indonesia, Muslim 
modernists were among the first who embraced modern education and 
Western curricula, used classrooms, tables, and chairs at their schools. 
Unlike traditionalists, modernists argue that the best understanding of 
Islam is derived from its original sources – the Qur'an and hadith.21 
After independence, they were among the best educated groups and 
were the most prepared to fill government positions.22 Politically, they 
were affiliated with Masyumi, the biggest Islamic party in Indonesia 
back then. Religiously, they were affiliated with various Muslim 
organizations, including Muhammadiyah, Persis, Al-Irsyad, and Jamiat 
al-Khayr. 
In 1960, Masyumi was banned by Soekarno for, among others, its 
involvement in a rebellion. When the government changed from 
Soekarno to Soeharto, some Masyumi leaders sought to restore the 
party. However, Soeharto did not want its revival and instead, in 1973, 
asked all Islamic parties to fuse into one called the United 
Development Party (PPP), which had no Muslim identification in its 
                                                                
20 Alfian, Islamic Modernism in Indonesian Politics: The Muhammadijah Movement During the 
Dutch Colonial Period (1912-1942) (Ann Arbor, Mich. u.a: Univ. Microfilms Internat, 
1984); B. J. Boland. The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia. KITLV, 1971; Deliar Noer. 
The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942. Oxford University Press, 1973; 
Mirjam Künkler and Alfred Stepan. Democracy and Islam in Indonesia. Columbia 
University Press, 2013. 
21 Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1973). 
22 Deliar Noer, Administration of  Islam in Indonesia (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 
2010). 
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name. Since then, modernists could not practically exercise their 
political ambitions. Many of them were disappointed but could not 
openly oppose Soeharto. Some of them threw their energy into Islamic 
proselytizing (dakwah). Muhammad Natsir, one of the leading Masyumi 
figures, established Dewan Dakwah Islam (DDI). Many others, from 
Muhammadiyah and other modernist organizations, focused on 
education and social services.23 Feeling repressed, some modernist 
groups developed an underground opposition to the regime. After the 
fall of Soeharto in 1998, they converted into Islamic parties such as the 
PKS and PBB. 
Some splinter groups of the Islamic modernist movement 
transformed into radical and intolerant groups. Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia (HTI) and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) are the most 
vocal ones of this kind. Scholars of Indonesian Islam usually no longer 
consider them as “modernist,” but rather as “fundamentalist” or 
“extremist.”24 Nevertheless, they have biological or ideological ties 
with modernists, particularly Muhammadiyah and Al-Irsyad. Some 
other Muslim modernists do not have any clear affiliation. They are 
rather independent groups of vague identity. According to SMRC and 
Indikator surveys, the followership of modernist groups in Indonesia is 
less than 10 percent.25 What is important to note here is that a 
majority of them supported Prabowo in the 2019 election. They were 
the most aggressive groups involved in negative campaigns against 
Jokowi. 
                                                                
23 Luthfi Assyaukanie, Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009). 
24 Masdar Hilmy, Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia: Piety and Pragmatism (Singapore: 
ISEAS, 2010). 
25 SMRC, “Survei Nasional,” January 24-31, 2019; Indikator Politik Indonesia, “Exit 
Poll Pemilu 2019,” April 17, 2019. 
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Among modernists, PKS was the most active party in addressing 
religious issues during the 2019 election. Since 2014, PKS has been 
backing Prabowo, beside Gerindra, his most loyal supporter. As 
mentioned earlier, both parties also endorsed Anies Baswedan in the 
2017 gubernatorial election in Jakarta. They aggressively used religious 
themes to topple Ahok. In the 2019 election, PKS was the staunchest 
critic of Jokowi and launched the “2019 Ganti Presiden” (2019 Change 
President) movement far before the official electoral campaign was 
started. The #2019GantiPresiden campaign was introduced by PKS 
chairman Mardani Ali Sera in the form of a Twitter hashtag on 29 
March 2018. The slogan quickly spread among anti-Jokowi groups. 
The hashtag was printed on t-shirts, flags, brochures, and billboards. 
Some people even sold it commercially on online platforms such as 
Tokopedia, Bukalapak, and Shopee. Various events and 
demonstrations were held in many cities, expressing one aim: to 
change the president. Although the slogan was understood as a 
movement to change Jokowi in a constitutional way, namely through 
election, many people saw it as advocating unconstitutional means.26 
                                                                
26  “Bawaslu Anggap Gerakan #2019GantiPresiden Bukan Kampanye Hitam,” 
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/04/10/19161191/bawaslu-anggap-gerakan-
2019gantipresiden-bukan-kampanye-hitam accessed on 11 July 2019; “Pengamat: Tagar 
#2019GantiPresiden Agitasi Dan Propaganda Politik,”  https://nasional.tempo.co/-
read/1077051/pengamat-tagar-2019gantipresiden-agitasi-dan-propaganda-politik 
accessed on 11 July 2019. 
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This is what Jokowi’s supporters felt when they accused the movement 
as being a treason attempt and demanded that security forces took 
action. Some people thought the hashtag was inspired by the anti-
Bashar al-Assad movement in Syria, which led to conflict and civil 
war.27 
The #2019GantiPresiden was like an umbrella for anti-Jokowi 
campaigns organized by the Prabowo camp. All criticism against 
Jokowi, be it related to his policies or his personal daily life, was 
directed to that hashtag. In short, whatever Jokowi did was wrong. 
PKS spread this message in mosques and Islamic teaching circles 
(pengajian). Every event that involved mass mobilization was 
accompanied by the #2019GantiPresiden slogan.  
The most enthusiastic groups to welcome the slogan were Hizbut 
Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Front Pembela Islam (FPI). They helped 
PKS support Prabowo in watering down Jokowi’s influence in Islamic 
bases. HTI had a very strong reason to be concerned with the election 
and to see Jokowi lose the competition. It is an Islamist organization 
whose biggest ideal is to establish a caliphate in Indonesia.28 It is 
against democracy and opposes elections on grounds that they are 
against Islamic doctrine. Prior to 2019, HTI did not want to be 
involved in the election process and was quite consistent in holding 
that democracy is not a right way for them to achieve their political 
aspirations. However, the 2019 election has pushed them to actively 
engage in the democratic electoral process. One of the main and 
obvious reasons was retaliation. In July 2017, Jokowi’s government 
announced that HTI is a dangerous organization for the republic and 
move to ban it. HTI tried to appeal at the Supreme Court but its plea 
was rejected. In February 2019, HTI was officially declared as an illegal 
organization in Indonesia.  
Although not officially, HTI members were actively engaged in 
anti-Jokowi mobilization. HTI flags were hoisted during every 
demonstration and mass rally in Jakarta and other cities. Many of the 
                                                                
27  “PKB: Suriah Kacau Karena Pakai Hashtag Ganti Presiden,” https://kum-
paran.com/kumparannews/pkb-suriah-kacau-karena-pakai-hashtag-ganti-presiden-15-
35454204015492319 accessed on 11 July 2019; “PKB: Hashtag Ganti Presiden Pernah 
Dipakai Di Suriah Dan Buat Kacau,”  https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4186706/pk-
b-hashtag-ganti-presiden-pernah-dipakai-di-suriah-dan-buat-kacau accessed on 11 July 
2019. 
28 Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and Political Islam: 
Identity, Ideology and Religio-Political Mobilization (New York: Routledge, 2018). 
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group's members were using social media for black campaigning 
against Jokowi. Like for many other modernists, their enthusiasm to 
fight the president was bigger than their passion to support Prabowo. 
They were generally aware that Prabowo was not an ideal figure for 
Muslims. But whoever could defeat Jokowi deserved their support.29 
This was also the strongest reason for FPI, another intolerant 
organization which has been very vocal in supporting Prabowo. FPI 
supported Prabowo not because its members idolized him but because 
they believed that Prabowo was the only person that could beat Jokowi. 
FPI has been holding a grudge against Jokowi and Ahok. Since they 
started to rule Jakarta in 2012, many FPI interests were hampered. 
They could no longer do what they had been doing in the past. 
PKS, FPI and HTI were the three musketeers that made 
Prabowo’s camp strongly Islamic. It was them who created Prabowo's 
image as an ideal leader figure for Muslims. Although they knew that 
Prabowo’s family is broken, with mostly Christian and secular 
background, they tried to cover it up. They presented him as Haji 
Muhammad Prabowo Subianto to make him look more Islamic. They 
brought him to Muslim clerics, religious circles and pesantren. All these 
moves sent a message that he was close with ulama and the Muslim 
community. 
Aware that they can no longer use the Indonesian Ulama Council 
(MUI) as they did during the Jakarta gubernatorial election, they 
initiated a new institution, Ijtima Ulama (meeting of ulama). Some of 
its initiators were leaders of the National Movement of Fatwa 
Defenders (GNPF), an organization that claims to be defending MUI 
fatwas. GNPF was responsible for criminalizing Ahok.30 Basically, 
Ijtima Ulama was a forum aimed at fully supporting Prabowo as a legal 
representative of Muslims. The institution consists mostly of 
modernist ulama and ustads. Almost none of NU clerics was involved 
in the forum. Some names were even unknown and just popped up on 
the political stage. Some of the forum's members are televangelists and 
YouTube motivators. In spite of having only minimal support of well-
known ulama, the forum continued to enthusiastically endorse 
Prabowo as the only legitimate candidate for Muslims.  
                                                                
29 Interview with Ahmad Suaedy, Jakarta, 9 July 2019. 
30  “GNPF MUI to Launch Rally on April 28 over Blasphemy Case,” 
https://en.tempo.co/read/869322/gnpf-mui-to-launch-rally-on-april-28-over-
blasphemy-case accessed on 13 July 2019. 
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Ijtima Ulama was created entirely for political purposes, 
particularly for the sake of having Prabowo win the 2019 election. The 
forum's founders claimed that it had over 600 clerics representing all 
Indonesian provinces. Yet only the names of a few of them were 
familiar in the media: PKS advisory board chairman Salim Segaf al-
Jufri, Abdul Rasyid Abdullah Syafii – Assyafi’iyah Islamic boarding 
school chairman – and Al Khatthath, chairman of the Forum Umat 
Islam (FUI). Since its formation, Ijtima Ulama held three general 
meetings. First on July 27-29, 2018, second on September 16, 2018, 
and third on May 1, 2019. The first two meetings were held before the 
election and designed to consolidate Prabowo’s supporters. The third 
meeting was held after the election and after the announcement of 
quick count results by pollsters that Prabowo lost the race. This 
particular meeting was held to claim that the election was marred by 
fraud and the General Election Commission (KPU) and the Election 
Supervisory Board (Bawaslu) should annul Jokowi’s victory. 
Some clerics and ustads voluntarily or involuntarily joined the 
forum. My source who was involved in the 212-mass rally in Jakarta 
explained that late Arifin Ilham was paid Rp 2 billion to support 
Prabowo. Arifin was known as a spiritualist ustad who had taught zikr 
(religious remembrance) to his followers. He had a big pesantren in 
Bogor. In some short videos that were spread on social media, Arifin 
campaigned for Prabowo and asked Indonesian Muslims to vote for 
him. He was one of the most influential figures in the 212 movement 
and wanted to reproduce the 2016 rallies in Jakarta for the sake of the 
2019 election.  
Another figure was Abdullah Gymnastiar, better known as Aa 
Gym. A cleric-turned-entrepreneur. In 2006, he stunned many of his 
followers by declaring that he wanted to take a second wife. His 
popularity quickly fell and he began to show his interest in politics. 
Like Arifin, Aa Gym is not a Muslim scholar with a deep knowledge of 
Islam. His speeches are simple and shallow. Since the polygamy 
scandal, he has been openly supporting any candidate who could 
benefit him. He was close to SBY and was often invited to the 
Presidential Palace. It was quite surprising that he favored Prabowo in 
the last election, as he would have gained more had he approached the 
incumbent. One of the reasons why he chose that move was probably 
a sense of solidarity with other modernist ustads. Another reason was 
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perhaps ideological. Like many other modernists, his rejection of 
Jokowi was likely propelled by the fact that Jokowi is a PDI-P man.  
PDIP has been portrayed as an anti-Islam party. My sources in 
Sumatra, Sulawesi, Java, Kalimantan, and Lombok, all said that 
modernists did not want to vote for Jokowi mainly because of his 
association with the PDI-P. Muslims in Non-Javanese provinces 
mostly do not like PDIP. In these regions, particularly in West Java, 
Banten, West Nusa Tenggara, and West Sumatra, Jokowi suffered a big 
loss. Firman Manan, a political science lecturer at Padjajaran University 
explained that “the Sundanese have actually no problem with Jokowi 
as a person. What worries them is PDI-P, the party that backs him.” 
This anti-PDI-P sentiment explains why the party never won 
gubernatorial elections in West Java. “Most Sundanese Muslims would 
vote against anyone backed by PDI-P.”31 
 
Traditionalist Response 
The political maneuvers by modernist groups from Prabowo's 
camp made traditionalists insecure. Most of them have actually no 
problem with Prabowo, as in 2014, many gave him their votes. 
However, the maneuvers by PKS, FPI and HTI worried them. Since 
Ma'ruf Amin was appointed as vice presidential candidate, he 
eventually became a target of attacks by Prabowo supporters. This 
made NU followers, who are well-known for loyalty to their kyai, quite 
uneasy. Before I explain further, let me clarify first who the 
“traditionalists” actually are. 
In the scholarly tradition of Indonesian Islam, Muslim 
traditionalists are often defined as a group that venerates Islamic 
tradition, particularly in relation to religious rituals. Traditionalists are 
generally resistant to modernity. In the early 20th century, they were 
those who were often associated with resistance to the religious reform 
movement brought to the country by Indonesian students who 
returned from the Middle East. In West Sumatra, traditionalists were 
known as “Kaum Tua” (the Old Ones), while reformists were called 
“Kaum Muda” – later known as modernists. In Java, traditionalists 
were those groups that challenged the reform movement launched by 
modernists, particularly from Muhammadiyah. One of the biggest 
traditionalist organizations is Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). In fact, the term 
                                                                
31 Interview with Firman Manan, July 12, 2019. 
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“traditionalist” is now almost exclusively associated with NU. Other 
traditionalist organizations with significant numbers of followers are 
Mathlaul Anwar in Banten and Nahdlatul Wathan in West Nusa 
Tenggara. 
During the early years of independence, traditionalists worked with 
modernists under the umbrella of Masyumi. However, in 1952 they 
withdrew from the party and founded their own, the NU Party. Since 
then, polarization between traditionalists and modernists has been 
sharpening. They not only differ in terms of religious interpretations 
and practices, but also in terms of politics. What was happening in the 
2019 election was a sort of political déjà vu of the 1950s. At the time, 
the traditionalist NU made a coalition to form a government with the 
Indonesian National Party (PNI), the party of Soekarno, whose 
daughter Megawati leads the PDI-P. On the other hand, the modernist 
Masyumi formed an opposition coalition with the Indonesian Socialist 
Party (PSI), the party of Prabowo’s father, Sumitro Djoyohadikusumo.  
It is important to note here how NU solidly supported Jokowi in 
2019. In 2014, some NU elites, including its chairman, Said Agil Siradj, 
openly supported Prabowo. But in 2019, most important NU figures 
and organizations backed Jokowi. In 2014, Indikator Politik Indonesia 
recorded that NU’s support for Jokowi was 42.2 percent. In 2019, it 
increased to 59.3 percent.32 The significant increase is important, 
particularly if we refer to the history of NU’s involvement in elections. 
Since the end of Soeharto's rule in 1998, NU has never so solidly 
supported one presidential candidate. 
Why NU was so united this time? There are at least two 
explanations. Jokowi's maneuver to appoint Ma'ruf as his running mate 
was crucial. Some experts argue that the Ma'ruf factor was not crucial 
in increasing Jokowi's vote, but in solidifying NU's support.33 Had 
Jokowi appointed another figure, the support might have not been this 
strong. In 2014, NU's support for Prabowo was quite high, also due to 
a then division among NU leaders. In the 2019 election, however, NU 
leaders were quite united. According to Rumadi Ahmad, head of a NU 
think tank, “Never in history had the central board of NU (PBNU) 
                                                                
32 Indikator Politik Indonesia, “Exit Poll Pemilu 2019,” April 17, 2019. 
33 Ahmad Najib Burhani, “Ma’ruf Factor in Jokowi’s Reelection Success,” The Jakarta 
Post (May 9, 2019). See also Azis Anwar Fachrudin, “Ma’ruf and NU Factor,” The 
Jakarta Post (May 18, 2019); Zain Maulana, “Ma’ruf Factor and Indonesia’s 
Democracy,” The Jakarta Post (May 24, 2019). 
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been as solid as in this presidential election”.34 Ma'ruf's position is 
quite unique. He is both a cleric and a politician. He is the chairman of 
the NU advisory board and a former chairman of the PKB advisory 
board. His charismatic position could unite both the organization and 
political party. 
Second, Ma'ruf's role was crucial in dividing the Muslim electorate 
which was quite solid during the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial poll. As 
mentioned above, Ma'ruf played a very important role in the election 
as he was one of the Muslim leaders behind the Ahok case. As the 
chairman of MUI, Ma'ruf got support from both modernists and 
traditionalists. For NU, he represented their voice and their pride. For 
the modernists, his religious authority was needed to bring Ahok down. 
With such a strategic position, Muslim solidity under Ma'ruf was a real 
threat for Jokowi. In SMRC surveys, which were then proven in the 
exit polls, Jokowi had a strong support among non-Muslim regions but 
relatively small in Muslim ones.35 If this situation was taken into 
account and politicized, like in the Jakarta election, it was quite 
probable for Jokowi to lose the race. However, by appointing Ma'ruf 
as his running mate, he automatically divided the Muslim vote. A 
majority of NU voters immediately vowed their support for Jokowi.  
Many people were puzzled by Jokowi's decision. Some of them 
argued that Jokowi was forced to make it by political parties from his 
camp. My sources in his campaign team said that PKB, the member of 
Jokowi's coalition, gave an ultimatum that if Jokowi did not take 
Ma'ruf as his vice-presidential candidate, they would withdraw their 
support.36 Other parties voiced similar threats to prevent Jokowi from 
appointing Mahfud MD. As Golkar was in favor of its chairman, 
Airlangga Hartarto, it was more acceptable for it to agree for Ma'ruf 
rather than other candidates. Nevertheless, a story by Raja Juli 
Anthony, the secretary general of the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI), 
who was very active in Jokowi's circle, might give us a different 
perspective. According to Raja Juli, it was Jokowi himself who wanted 
Ma'ruf. He felt it would be more convenient to work with Ma'ruf, an 
old man who does not know much government affairs, than with 
Mahfud MD, who could dictate his terms. Mahfud is an experienced 
                                                                
34 Interview with Rumadi Amad, Jakarta, July 9, 2019. 
35 SMRC, “Survei Nasional,” January 24-31, 2019. 
36 Conversation with Rizal Mallarangeng, Jakarta, May 14, 2019. 
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politician who supported Prabowo in 2014. “It would not be easy for 
Jokowi to steer Mahfud as the man knows his things. He would not be 
easy to work with, particularly on legal issues”.37 
Whether Ma'ruf was a significant factor in helping Jokowi win the 
election has become a hot debate among scholars and political 
observers in Indonesia and abroad. Some scholars argue that he has no 
impact on Jokowi's victory. At the local level, particularly in Banten, 
the province from which Ma'ruf comes, Jokowi lost the race. As a 
matter of fact, Jokowi's vote in the province has even decreased 
compared to the 2014 election. If we refer to an exit-poll released by 
Indikator, there appeared no direct correlation between Jokowi's 
victory and Ma'ruf's role. This is quite consistent with other surveys by 
SMRC several months prior to the election, which gave no indication 
that Ma'ruf had any impact on Jokowi's electability.38 However, I 
would argue that his role should be seen not merely in the number of 
votes, but in the process of his appointment and his position in NU. It 
should be noted here that Ma'ruf's appointment was not due to his 
position as an MUI leader, but rather as the NU chairman and a 
charismatic PKB leader. The most enthusiastic support came from 
PKB chairman, Muhaimin Iskandar and some PKB elites. My sources 
confirmed that PKB threatened to leave the coalition had Jokowi 
chosen Mahfud MD. The fact that Jokowi finally chose Ma'ruf meant a 
lot for PKB and NU. 
PKB was an important factor in consolidating NU support in East 
and Central Java. They campaigned all-out for Jokowi, exclusively 
because of Ma'ruf, their leader. During the campaign, Ma'ruf was 
highlighted as an NU figure who had to be defended and supported at 
all cost. Ma'ruf himself too emphasized himself as an NU 
representative and not a representative of Islam like modernists would 
do for their candidate. Ma'ruf's goal was obvious, he specifically 
addressed NU voters. The result was quite effective. From exit poll 
data we knew that there was a dramatic surge in NU supporter for 
Jokowi compared to the 2014 election. It is worth to note here that the 
starkest difference between NU and most of modernists is that NU 
never talks in the name of Islam in its campaigns. They never raise the 
issue that Islam is being threatened, while this rhetoric is frequently 
                                                                
37 Conversation with Raja Juli Anthony, Jakarta, April 17, 2019. 
38 SMRC, “Survei Nasional,” January 24-31, 2019. 
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employed by modernists. According to Rumadi Ahmad, a chairman of 
NU think tank, for NU members, the existence of NU is much more 
crucial than that of Islam, simply because they feel that Islam will be 
fine as God will protect it. “That is why, NU people are not interested 
in the ‘defending Islam’ rhetoric which modernists boast. For them, it 
is the existence of NU that must be defended”.39 
Jokowi's decision to pick Ma'ruf was successful. NU members 
were united to support him. Most of their campaigns countered the 
negative narratives against Jokowi that came from modernists. Not 
only did they portray Jokowi as a good Muslim, but also a good santri. 
His photograph in sarung and a black cap was spread everywhere. A 
photograph where Jokowi was sitting together with charismatic NU 
leader, Gus Dur, was circulated in social media. They also aggressively 
attacked Prabowo and his followers. Every Friday, the hashtag 
#PrabowoSholatJumatDimana (where does Prabowo offer his Friday 
prayers?), questioning Prabowo's commitment to Islam, became a 
trending topic. Issues pertaining to Prabowo's family background (his 
mother, his sisters and his brother are Christians and his son is gay) 
were exploited by NU-related websites and social media. 
In Central and East Java, NU's support for Jokowi was extremely 
solid. Ed Aspinall who during the campaign traveled to both provinces 
reported that pro-Jokowi campaigns were massive and aggressive.40 
My sources in Semarang and Surabaya told me that NU clerics and 
preachers were deeply involved in the campaign, including at pesantren 
and mosques. During Friday sermons, the khatib would often ask the 
crowd, mostly NU members, to vote for Jokowi, as they should help 
their kyai – Ma'ruf – win the election.41 PKB and NU played a crucial 
role in mobilizing NU votes. Some NU clerics issued a sort of a fatwa 
that voting for Jokowi is obligatory (wajib) for Muslims. In NU's 
theological understanding, wajib means something that must be done 
and it would be sinful to disobey the order. My sources told me that 
they would follow what their kyais had said as they were afraid to sin. 
This kind of campaign would be impossible to imagine had there been 
no involvement of NU and PKB. And the key factor behind their 
action was no other than Ma'ruf Amin. 
                                                                
39 Interview with Rumadi Ahmad, July 9, 2019. 
40  Edward Aspinall, “Indonesia’s Election and the Return of Ideological 
Competition,” New Mandala, April 22, 2019. 
41 Interview with Ceprudin, Semarang, July 5, 2019. 
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For Jokowi, NU’s support was crucial, not only to demonstrate his 
Islamic credentials, but also and more importantly, to win the election. 
Statistically, NU accounts for more than 50 percent of Indonesian 
voters. This is much more than the number of modernists, whose 
combined population is less than 10 percent. This explains why Jokowi 
preferred to choose Ma'ruf and approached NU. In electoral 
democracy, nothing is more important than numbers. 
 
Conclusion 
The 2019 presidential election was one of the most divisive 
political events in the modern history of Indonesia. One of the main 
reasons was the excessive use of religion for electoral gain by both 
secular and religious players. There are several factors that led to 
religion, i.e. Islam, being utilized in that poll. First, it was due to a 
residue of the 2014 political contest, particularly the previous 
presidential election, where the same candidates run for office. During 
that election, the issue of religion was quite effective in elevating and 
delegitimizing both candidates. The fact that the margin between them 
was quite close has triggered both camps, particularly Prabowo's, to 
intensify the use of religion in campaigning. The result of the 2017 
Jakarta gubernatorial election was another trigger for the Prabowo 
camp to employ the same strategy in 2019. Almost all methods and 
persons involved in the 2019 presidential election were present in the 
2017 gubernatorial one.  
Second, in the absence of alternative political programs, religion 
seemed the best way to challenge the incumbent. Both Jokowi and 
Prabowo actually have more similarities than differences. Both come 
from non-religious backgrounds and are affiliated with nationalist 
parties whose populist visions are more or less the same. Both parties 
have worked together in the past. As a matter of fact, Prabowo was the 
running mate of Megawati Soekarnoputri in the 2009 presidential vote, 
Jokowi was personally endorsed by Prabowo and backed by his 
Gerindra when he run in the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election. Most 
of what Prabowo tried to offer in his campaigns had already been part 
of Jokowi's programs – poverty reduction, building roads and 
infrastructure, increasing the quality of education, opening up job 
opportunities, and universal healthcare. There was nothing left for 
Prabowo to offer. The only thing his supporters could do was playing 
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on sentiments to make voters more comfortable by choosing Jokowi's 
contender. 
Third, the conservative turn is often referred to as the main cause 
of politicization of religion. Indonesian Islam is generally conservative. 
However, the influence of Salafism and Wahabism in the last two 
decades has become more prominent. Intolerant groups such as FPI, 
HTI and PKS supported Prabowo, which made the political contest 
heavily polarized. Traditionalists, particularly NU, responded in a quite 
unusual way to their maneuvers. As respected NU cleric Ma'ruf Amin 
was appointed as Jokowi's running mate, NU's stake in the election 
increased. The rivalry between modernists and traditionalists was 
certainly a key factor leading to the overt politicization of religion in 
the recent presidential vote. [] 
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